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The financial crisis has highlighted the need for models that can identify counterparty 
risk exposures and shock transmission processes at the systemic level. We use the 
euro area financial accounts (flow of funds) data to construct a sector-level network of 
bilateral balance sheet exposures and show how local shocks can propagate 
throughout the network and affect the balance sheets in other, even seemingly remote, 
parts of the financial system. We then use the contingent claims approach to extend 
this accounting-based network of interlinked exposures to risk-based balance sheets 
which are sensitive to changes in leverage and asset volatility. We conclude that the 
bilateral cross-sector exposures in the euro area financial system constitute important 
channels through which local risk exposures and balance sheet dislocations can be 
transmitted, with the financial intermediaries playing a key role in the processes. High 
financial leverage and high asset volatility are found to increase a sector’s 
vulnerability to shocks and contagion.  
 
Keywords: Balance sheet contagion, financial accounts, network models, contingent 
claims analysis, systemic risk, macro-prudential analysis.  
 





































The process of financial stability assessment typically involves identification of risks and 
vulnerabilities in various parts of the financial system. It also calls for identification of 
potential triggering events which, if crystallised, could flip the state of the financial system 
from stability to instability. However, the events of the recent global financial turmoil have 
demonstrated that financial stability analysis should also aim at identifying links between 
sectors and channels through which local shocks may propagate wider in the financial system. 
Seeing the financial system as a network of interlinked exposures can help to detect such 
transmission mechanisms. Analysis of this network may then reveal that parts of the financial 
system that might not be considered particularly vulnerable to a given adverse scenario could 
still be affected due to their close interconnection with sectors that are directly confronted by 
the unforeseen events.  
This paper proposes a new framework that captures several types of interlinkages within the 
financial system. The approach yields three main contributions to the existing work: first, by 
using the data from the euro area financial accounts and thus focusing on sector-level bilateral 
exposures, we aim at filling a gap in the literature that applies networks to financial stability 
analysis. The existing studies mainly look at bilateral exposures at the firm-level, such as in 
the inter-bank money markets, or at the country level, typically using cross-border banking 
flows data. Second, in the latter part of the paper, we apply the contingent claims analysis to 
extend the constructed accounting-based network of bilateral exposures to a risk-based 
network where we can trace the propagation of volatility shocks and changes in risk 
exposures. This extension provides particularly interesting results as regards the interactions 
between leverage and volatility in an environment where measures of credit risk are 
characterised by strong non-linearities. Third, we carry out simulation exercises which 
illustrate the extent of balance sheet contagion (defined as the propagation of mark-to-market 
losses along the bilateral exposures) and risk contagion (defined as an increase in correlation 
among sector-level risk exposures in times of financial stress) in the euro area financial 
system.  
The data that is used to construct the sector-level balance sheets are from the euro area 
accounts (EAA), published jointly by the ECB and Eurostat. This type of data is also known 
as flow of funds statistics which are available in most developed economies – based on the 
common definitions listed in the world-wide manual of System of National Accounts (SNA) – 
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in varying instrument breakdowns, publication frequencies and lengths of time series. The 
EAA form a closed system which means that each financial asset item of a sector has a 
counterparty item on the liability side of some other sector. Due this internal consistency, the 
EAA are well suitable for analysis that aims at identifying counterparty risk exposures and 
shock propagation channels in various financial instrument categories at the sector level.  
The main results can be summarised as follows. Over the first ten years of the EMU, the 
bilateral financial accounts network linkages have grown markedly, with the banking sector 
constituting a key part of the euro area financial system. In simulation exercises we analyse 
the propagation of shocks and contagion in the network of sector-level balance sheets in a 
multi-period context and find that under mark-to-market accounting, local cash-flow shocks 
can spread around quickly along the bilateral exposures even when there are no defaults in the 
process, with banks and non-financial firms playing key roles in the transmission. These 
results provide interesting empirical support to the conceptual models of shock transmission 
via balance sheet exposures as formalised, among others, by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 
2002), Goodhart (2006) and Shin (2008). We then calculate the risk-based balance sheets for 
individual sectors following the recent conceptual work by Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) 
and Gary and Malone (2008) and show how these evolved prior to and after the recent 
financial turmoil broke out. Simulation exercises on the risk-based network illustrate how 
correlations among sector-level risk indicators surged amid the outbreak of the financial 
turmoil in mid-2007. We also show how sector-level credit risk indicators are affected by 
shocks in other parts of the network and how the risk indicators of sectors with highest 
leverage are the most vulnerable ones to shocks to volatility. In that sense, higher leverage 
increases sensitivity to volatility shocks in the same way as in deeply out-of-the money 
options.   
In a recent paper, Borio and Drehmann (2009) argue that the desirable features of an 
operational financial stability framework should include, inter alia, the following three 
characteristics. First, it should focus on the financial system as a whole as opposed to 
individual institutions. Second, the more interconnected areas of the system should deserve 
more attention than others. Third, the analysis should capture common exposures, arising 
either from claims to non-financial sectors or from exposures within the financial sector. Our 
proposed framework captures these features and it thus provides one contribution to the work 
towards such operational frameworks. It also opens up several avenues for further research in 
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 1. Introduction 
 
The process of financial stability assessment typically involves identification of risks and 
vulnerabilities in various parts of the financial system. It also calls for identification of 
potential triggering events which, if crystallised, could flip the state of the financial system 
from stability to instability. But the events of the recent global financial turmoil have 
demonstrated that financial stability analysis should, perhaps first and foremost, also aim at 
identifying links between sectors and channels through which local shocks may propagate 
wider in the financial system.
1 Seeing the financial system as a network of interlinked 
exposures can help to detect such transmission mechanisms. Analysis of this network may 
then reveal that parts of the financial system that might not be considered particularly 
vulnerable to a given adverse scenario could still be affected due to their close interconnection 
with sectors that are directly confronted by the unforeseen events.
2  
This paper proposes a new framework for analysing financial system stability that captures 
several types of interlinkages within the financial system. The approach yields three main 
contributions to the existing work: first, by using the flow of funds data from the euro area 
financial accounts and thus focusing on sector-level bilateral exposures, we aim at filling a 
gap in the literature that applies networks to financial stability analysis. The existing studies 
mainly look at bilateral exposures at the firm-level, such as in the interbank money markets, 
or at the country level, typically using cross-border banking flows data.
3 Second, in the latter 
part of the paper, we apply the contingent claims analysis to extend the constructed 
accounting-based network of bilateral exposures to a risk-based network where we can trace 
also the propagation of volatility shocks and changes in risk exposures. This extension 
provides particularly interesting results as regards the interactions between leverage and 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the spreading of the financial turmoil from the external environment via the off-balance sheet vehicles to 
euro area banks and further to other financial and non-financial sectors as the financial crisis evolved in 2007-09 
exposed unforeseen counterparty linkages and eroded confidence in the way which further amplified the effect of 
the initial shocks.  
2 Reflecting growing awareness of such network externalities for financial stability analysis, recommendations 
issued by several committees for reforming the European financial supervision advised that more comprehensive 
systemic risk indicators, such as “financial stability maps” should be developed (see for example de Larosiere, 
2009). In a normative dimension, understanding the structure and characteristics of the financial networks could 
also lead to recommendations for structural changes that may enhance the robustness and resilience of the system 
as recently suggested by Haldane (2009). 
3 For European studies on interbank networks, see e.g. Becher, Millard and Soramaki (2008), van Lelyveld and 
Liedorp (2006), Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells (2004). On the country-level networks, see McGuire and 
Tarashev (2008) and Castrén, Fell and Valckx (2009). Important theoretical contributions to network analysis are 
Watts (2004) and Gallegati et al (2008) which also contain extensive surveys of related literature.  
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volatility in an environment where measures of credit risk are characterised by strong non-
linearities. Third, we carry out simulation exercises which illustrate the extent of balance 
sheet contagion (defined as propagation of mark-to-market losses along the bilateral 
exposures) and risk contagion (defined as an increase in correlation among sector-level risk 
exposures in times of financial stress) in the euro area financial system.   
The main results of our work can be summarised as follows. Over the first ten years of the 
EMU, the bilateral financial accounts network linkages have grown markedly, with the 
banking sector constituting a key part of the euro area financial system. In simulation 
exercises we analyse the propagation of shocks and contagion in the network of sector-level 
balance sheets in a multi-period context and find that under mark-to-market accounting, local 
cash-flow shocks can spread around quickly along the bilateral exposures even when there are 
no defaults in the process, with banks and non-financial firms playing key roles in the 
transmission. These results provide interesting empirical support to the conceptual models of 
shock transmission via balance sheet exposures as formalised, among others, by Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997, 2002), Goodhart (2006) and Shin (2008). We then calculate the risk-based 
balance sheets for individual sectors following the recent conceptual work by Gray, Merton 
and Bodie (2007) and Gary and Malone (2008). Simulation exercises on the risk-based 
network illustrate how correlations among sector-level risk indicators surged amid the 
outbreak of the financial turmoil in mid-2007. We also show how sector-level credit risk 
indicators are affected by shocks in other parts of the network and how the risk indicators of 
sectors with highest leverage are the most vulnerable ones to shocks to volatility. In that 
sense, higher leverage increases sensitivity to volatility shocks in the same way as in deeply 
out-of-the money options.   
In a recent paper, Borio and Drehmann (2009) argue that the desirable features of an 
operational financial stability framework should include, inter alia, the following three 
characteristics. First, it should focus on the financial system as a whole as opposed to 
individual institutions. Second, the more interconnected areas of the system should deserve 
more attention than others. Third, the analysis should capture common exposures, arising 
either from claims to non-financial sectors or from exposures within the financial sector. Our 
proposed framework captures these features and it thus provides one contribution to the work 
towards such operational frameworks. It also opens up several avenues for further research in 
financial stability and macro-prudential analysis using network models and risk-based balance 
sheets.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the balance sheet data and 
discusses the pros and cons of using financial accounts data in the context of financial 
stability analysis. In section 3 we calculate the network of bilateral balance sheet exposures. 
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Section 4 analyses the transmission of shocks in the accounting-based network. Section 5 
contains the analysis of risk-based balance sheets. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Description of the balance sheet data   
In this paper the euro area financial system is considered as a closely intertwined group of 
seven distinct sectors: households including non-profit institutions serving households, non-
financial corporations (NFCs), banks (MFIs), insurance and pension fund companies, other 
financial intermediaries (OFIs), general government, and the rest of the world (RoW).
4 These 
sectors cover the entire economy and including the RoW sector the system is closed, i.e. paid 
transactions in the system have to equal received transactions. This means that each financial 
asset item of a sector has a counterparty item on the liability side of some other sector.  
The data that is used to construct the sector-level balance sheets are from the euro area 
accounts (EAA), published jointly by the ECB and Eurostat. In the EAA, the analytical 
grouping of economic agents into institutional sectors and transactions is based on the 
methodological framework established in the European System of Accounts 1995 (ESA95).
5 
This type of data is often referred to as the flow of funds statistics which are available in most 
developed economies in varying instrument breakdowns, publication frequencies and lengths 
of time series. These data are broadly comparable between different countries as the overall 
framework is defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA), a worldwide manual for the 
compilation of national accounts. Importantly, the EAA data are non-consolidated which 
means that they include financial linkages not only between the sectors but also within the 
sectors in the system. This will have important implications to the analysis below.  
Due to its internal consistency, the EAA are well suitable for analysis that aims at identifying 
counterparty risk exposures and shock propagation channels at the sector level. At the same 
time, this characteristic also gives raise to its main weakness as some economically important 
non-financial stocks and instruments do not have counterparty items on the liability sides. 
Therefore such items, most notably housing assets, have to be excluded from analyses which 
                                                 
4 Our definition of “financial system” is therefore relatively broad and based on accounting terms. Other 
definitions can be more nuanced. For example, in its Financial Stability Review the ECB defines the financial 
system as consisting of financial markets, institutions and infrastructures.  
5 The sectoral breakdown adopted in this paper is identical to the sectoral detail in the EAA. For more details, see 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/titelen.htm. The ESA95 stands for the “European 
System of Accounts 1995” and it is an application of “System of National Accounts 1993”  (SNA93).  According 
to the ESA95 principle all data are valued at market prices. However, the practical application of market prices is 
not always straightforward since all financial instruments, such as loans, do not have proper secondary markets. In 
such cases the data is estimated as close to the market price as possible. The euro area figures are aggregated from 
the individual country data and the specific estimation methods can vary from country to country. Currently, only 
some countries publish parts of their financial accounts data at quarterly frequency and therefore European 
institutions do not publish country level figures. At annual frequency these data are published by most of the 
European Union member states. 
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use financial accounts data.
6 Annex 1 discusses the link between financial and non-financial 
wealth in more detail and illustrates how housing assets and housing wealth are recorded in 
the integrated (i.e. financial and real) accounts. 
Chart 1 illustrates the composition of the EAA financial accounts balance sheets (assets and 
liabilities) of the seven sectors at the end of the second quarter of 2009; the relative shares of 
the various asset and liability stock items tend to remain rather constant over time. The 
categories of financial instruments included in the balance sheets are distinguished in the 
ESA95 national accounts which are classified according to liquidity factors and legal 
characteristics.  
 
Chart 1: The composition of sector-level balance sheets in the euro area financial 
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For most sectors, the asset sides of the financial account balance sheets consist of holdings, in 
different proportions, of cash and money market instruments as well as debt and equity 
securities. Several sectors (notably MFI, but also non-financial firms and OFIs) also extend 
large amounts of loans to the other sectors. There are also smaller asset items, such as pre-
                                                 
6 The non-financial assets could be technically included in the financial balance sheets by securitising them in the 
accounting framework. In practice, a new imaginary counterparty sector, which would technically own the 
properties, would then have these non-financial assets in its balance sheet. The imaginary sector would have shares 
as liabilities, the value of which would be equal to the value of the non-financial assets. These balance sheet items 
would in turn be counter-parted to the actual owner sector of the non-financial assets. However, this arrangement 
would not reflect the true state of the world since the imaginary counter-party sector would not have any analytical 
interpretation. Similar kinds of constructions have been applied in some of the national applications where housing 
corporations have been recognised as an independent sector in the national accounts.  
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payments of insurance premia and net equity in life insurance and pension funds. Owing to 
the inclusion of the rest of the world sector these asset holdings include instruments that are 
originated by both domestic and foreign counterparties.  
In contrast to the asset holdings, the sector-specific liability positions show more distinct 
characteristics. The liabilities of the non-financial firm sector consist of loans, as well as 
equity and debt securities issued to other firms and other sectors in the financial system. For 
banks (MFI), the liabilities are deposits collected from other banks and from the private 
sector, as well as currency, stocks and bonds issued to the other sectors.
7 The bulk of the OFI 
sector liabilities are mutual fund shares while the largest share of the insurance and pension 
funds sector’s liabilities consist of net equity of households in life insurance premia and in 
pension funds. For government, the largest share of liabilities is represented by government 
bonds which in developed economies are mostly denominated in domestic currency. 
Household sector liabilities consist almost entirely of MFI loans to finance housing and 
consumption expenditures. Finally, for the rest of the world sector, both sides of the balance 
sheet are rather evenly split between cash, loans and securities.  
Despite that fact that in integrated financial accounts, like the EAA, the assets must equal 
liabilities at the system level, this is not necessarily the case at the sector level. Indeed, some 
sectors in the financial system may show systematic deficits in their financial accounts whilst 
other sectors may report systematic surpluses. The non-financial corporations and government 
sectors are typically (although not always) net debtors, while households form the main 
creditor sector. In so far as the deficits run by the domestic borrowing sectors exceed the 
surpluses recorded by the domestic lending sectors, the gap must be financed by borrowing 
from the rest of the world. In fact, the financial position of the rest of the world sector mirrors, 
by definition, the current account of the balance of payments of the domestic financial 
system.
8  
The difference between a sector’s financial assets and its liabilities amounts to that sector’s 
net financial wealth position which will become important in the later parts of this paper. 
Chart 2 illustrates the evolution over time of the net financial wealth positions in the sectors 
of the euro area financial system, with the positive net financial wealth of the surplus sectors 
(mainly households and the rest of the world) matching the negative net financial wealth of 
the deficit sectors (mainly government and non-financial firms). It is noteworthy that in 
financial accounts, the net financial wealth of the financial sectors (i.e. the MFI, insurance and 
OFI sectors) is close to zero. This reflects the fact that as financial intermediaries, the bulk of 
                                                 
7 Note that in EAA, the central bank is incorporated in the MFI sector.  
8 Note that despite the fact that the rest of world sector “closes” the system, it is actually an independent sector and 
its balance sheet is calculated on the basis of own data sources.  
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the assets and liabilities of these sectors consist of financial instruments while their holdings 
of real assets such as real estate and production assets are relatively minor.
9 
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3. The network of balance sheet exposures for the euro area financial 
system  
Although the EAA form a closed system in the sense that all financial assets must have a 
counterparty item in some other sector’s liability side, the financial accounts do not currently 
provide detailed information about the specific counterparties of the instruments issued by a 
given sector (the so called “who-to-whom” accounts). In the absence of this information, we 
estimate the bilateral balance sheet linkages between sectors. When the aggregate asset 
(liability) holdings of each sector are known on an instrument-by-instrument basis, the 
allocation of these aggregate holdings across the liabilities (assets) of all other sectors can be 
                                                 
9 Net wealth and its role in allocating the sectors to borrowers and lenders in the financial system provide a link 
between the financial and the real accounts. Net wealth (a stock measure) can be defined as accumulated lending or 
borrowing (flow measures), including changes in prices and other components. Net lending/borrowing of a sector 
can be further decomposed to investment (gross capital formation) and saving. Therefore, shocks to savings and 
investment are conveyed to the financial accounts via their impact on the flows of net lending and, therefore, on 
the net wealth position. Conversely, shocks from the financial part of the economy are transmitted via the net 
lending/borrowing positions to the non-financial parts of the economy. This linkage is illustrated in Annex 1.  
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approximated using maximum entropy techniques which exploit the relative shares of the 
sector-specific total assets and liabilities. The applications of such methods are common in 
statistical exercises, input-output analyses and in models of financial contagion and interbank 
networks (see e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000, Upper and Worms, 2004, Wells, 2004 and van 
Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006).
10  
More specifically, the bilateral exposures among N sectors under each financial instrument 
category k can be collected in an NxN matrix Xk with entries xij, where xij denotes the exposure 
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The sum of all the elements  ij x  in a given row corresponds to the total instrument k-specific 
assets  ai,k held by a sector and issued by the other sectors. Accordingly, the sum of the 
elements in a given column equals the total instrument k-specific liabilities lj,k of a sector 
claimed by the other sectors. Under maximum entropy, the individual elements  ij x  are 
estimated using information about the relative distribution of the sum elements ai,k and lj,k, 
assuming that the a’s and l’s are realizations of the marginal distributions f(a) and f(l) and that 
Xk amounts to their joint distribution f(a,l).  
For analyses that use firm-level data or consolidated accounts, this procedure has the 
unappealing feature that the diagonals of the matrices Xk can be non-zeroes (implying that 
agents would have transactions with themselves). To fix this problem, additional constraints 
need to be included in the estimation process to guarantee that the elements on the diagonals 
equal zeroes.
11 Since the data in the parts of the EEA used in this paper are non-consolidated, 
however, they do include transactions within sectors so that there is no reason why the 
elements in the diagonals of the Xk matrices should amount to zeroes. For example, firms 
                                                 
10 An exception is Mueller (2006) who uses data from the Swiss interbank market which provide complete who-to-
whom accounts.  
11 In the case of input-output analysis the technique is referred to as RAS-procedure, named after the typical 
sequence of matrices. The RAS has the following properties: 1) the signs of individual elements are preserved; 2) 
zero elements remain zeroes; and 3) enforcement of consistency may cause implausible changes in some of the 
coefficients. See for instance: Eurostat Manual of Supply and Use and Input-Output Tables 2008. 
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within the NFC sector and banks within the MFI sector can lend to and borrow from each 
other and own each others’ shares and debt instruments.
12  
Annex 2 shows the estimated who-to-whom exposures for each sector, instrument-by-
instrument, as of 2009 Q2. They suggest, among other things, that on the asset sides almost all 
of the currency and deposits held by different sectors are originated by the MFI sector while 
the bulk of the debt securities held by other sectors are issued by the government sector. Most 
of the loans extended by the MFI and the OFI sectors are to the NFC and the household 
sectors, while equity holdings of various sectors to a large extent consist of shares issued by 
the NFC and the RoW sectors. On the liability sides, the estimated bilateral linkages indicate 
that large parts of debt securities issued by various sectors are counter-partied by the MFI, 
insurance and RoW sectors while by far the largest share of loans are owed to the MFI sector. 
The NFC and the OFI sectors are the largest holders of the equity shares issued by most 
sectors. These results are all intuitive and in the absence of detailed who-to-whom accounts 
they provide useful approximations of the true bilateral exposures.   
Once the bilateral exposures have been calculated for each instrument category, a network 
connecting all sectors in the financial system can be constructed using the gross exposures, 
i.e. assets plus liabilities connecting individual sectors in all instrument categories. Chart 3 
illustrates this network of balance sheet gross exposures for the euro area financial system at 
two distinct points in time, in the first quarter of 1999 and the second quarter of 2009. In 
Chart 3, the sizes of the nodes describe the exposures within sectors. These include, among 
other items, cross-shareholdings of firms and financial institutions and intercompany loans. 
The links show the gross bilateral cross-sector exposures, summed up across all instrument 
categories; the thickness of the link connecting two sectors is commensurate with the 
magnitude of this gross exposure.  
The degree of nodes (i.e. the number of links connecting each sector) is six in case of all 
sectors. This means that the degree distribution of the network is symmetric, resembling a 
“complete” structure of claims in the terminology by Allen and Gale (2000). This could be 
expected in the case of a network of gross exposures which consists of a relatively small 
number of nodes: at an aggregated level each sector has at least some asset or liability link to 
all other sectors in the euro area financial system. Looking at the bilateral exposures at the 
instrument level the picture changes as there are sectors which are not connected to some of 
the other sectors in some instrument categories, while there are sectors that can be highly 
interconnected in most instrument categories (see also Annex 2).  
                                                 
12 For the intra-rest of the world sector, the who-to-whom statistics are zeroes by definition also in non-
consolidated data. This causes a discrepancy which we have corrected using RAS. Additionally, in the current 
version of the data the intra-MFI sector currency and deposits flows are consolidated.   
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Chart 3: Cross-sector balance sheet gross exposures in the euro area financial system in 











Note: The size of the node illustrates the amount of gross exposures (assets plus liabilities) within 
sectors. The thickness of the links shows the size of the gross exposures between two sectors.  
  
Three main observations can be drawn from Chart 3. The first is the overall increase in the 
size of balance sheet exposures over the first decade of Economic and Monetary Union, 
suggesting that interconnectiveness in the euro area financial system has expanded over this 
time period. While this in “normal” times would indicate enhanced risk sharing in the 
financial system, one can also imagine unanticipated events which may tip the network to a 
state where it works as a shock amplifier rather than a shock absorber. We will return to this 
point in detail in section 5 below.  
The second is the crucial role played by the banking (MFI) sector in the euro area financial 
system. As a financial intermediary, it holds liabilities in the form of deposits collected 
mainly from the household, NFC and RoW sectors, while it holds assets in the form of loans 
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mostly extended to these same sectors. In addition, the MFI sector also plays an important 
role in securities markets, as it issues equity and debt securities mainly to the household, 
insurance, OFI and RoW sectors and holds securities issued mainly by the NFC, OFI, 
government and RoW sectors. Although the degree of nodes in the matrix of gross exposures 
is the same for all sectors, the large volume of the links connecting the MFI sector to the rest 
of the system provides it a role as a “hub” in the network. For that reason, it is evident that 
stresses in the MFI sector would have substantial negative spill-over effects into practically 
all other sectors in the network of euro area financial system while the MFI sector is directly 
exposed to balance sheet shocks especially from the household, NFC, RoW and OFI sectors.  
The third observation is the increasing role played by the OFI sector over the past ten years. 
While in the euro area this sector mostly consists of investment funds (mostly bond funds), its 
growth over time also reflects the expansion of lending to firms and households by non-bank 
financial intermediaries as well as the growth of the special purpose vehicles for securitisation 
purposes and other off-balance sheet structures which are included in the OFI sector.  
Overall, the estimated network of bilateral exposures provides an important tool for systemic 
risk analysis. Indeed, assessing financial claims in a network concept captures several features 
that are missing in partial analyses that consider the individual sectors as separate and 
disconnect from the rest of the system. Among the useful features are the possibilities to 
model disruptions in credit chains, transmission of securities losses as well as liquidity 
spillovers that result from local balance sheet expansions or contractions. In addition, the 
framework captures counterparty risks that in normal times may be unknown or otherwise of 
little concern for the various agents in the financial system but could give rise to adverse 
surprises when an unanticipated shock hits a sector several steps away in the chain of mutual 
exposures.  
 
4. Transmission of shocks in the network of balance sheet exposures  
We can now take advantage of the network of financial exposures sketched out in Chart 3 to 
analyse how shocks to some sectors may cause chain reactions in which the balance sheets of 
other sectors are also adversely affected. The theoretical underpinnings for such shock 
transmission processes are provided in the literature on credit chains and balance sheet 
contagion that are illustrated in the papers by Shin (2008) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997 and 
2002).
13 The basic intuition behind these models is that the mutual extension of credit or debt 
by agents in the financial system creates balance sheet interlinkages which can act as channels 
                                                 
13 In addition, Haldane (2009) provides a recent review of analysis of network contagion in financial systems in 
relation to the models developed in other sciences.  
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of contagion if some of the debtors become unable to service their obligations to their 
creditors. In the network model introduced above, we include the entire balance sheets of 
sectors. Therefore, we are not constrained to credit relationships but can analyse also 
counterparty exposures that arise through all types of financial instrument cross-holdings, 
including debt and equity securities and deposit instruments.
14  
Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify the definitions of “transmission”, “propagation” and 
“contagion” in the current context. The literature has yet to reach a consensus on the precise 
definitions, but Gallegati et al (2008) provide a detailed discussion of the differences between 
these concepts and their relationships to risk sharing and diffusion processes. While these 
terms are used somewhat interchangeably below, in our context they relate to the broad case 
where a cash-flow shock is initially assigned on one sector which is linked to the other sectors 
via the network of bilateral balance sheet exposures. As a result of these links, other sectors’ 
balance sheets (or risk exposures as introduced below in section 5) are then also affected.  
To illustrate the propagation of shocks in the network, imagine a simplified three-sector 
framework where a shock to sector A’s cash flow affects the balance sheet items of 
counterparty sectors B and C and, on further rounds, the balance sheet of sector A itself. The 
shock can be modelled as a sudden decline in net income which causes a deficit in A’s profit 
and loss (P&L) account. Importantly, we impose the simple behavioural rule that A and all the 
other sectors are subject to mark-to-market accounting, which implies that on every period 
they have to deduct losses on P&L accounts or on available-for-sale assets from shareholder 
equity (see also Shin, 2008). In such a set-up shocks are quickly transmitted from P&L 
accounts to shareholder equity and further to the balance sheets of other sectors via cross-
holdings of shares, with no need to assume defaults in the process.
15  
In Chart 4 we show how the contagion from the shock to sector A’s balance sheet to B’s and 
C’s balance sheets takes place through the loss of net financial wealth that occurs via the 
                                                 
14 Empirical applications of balance sheet contagion typically focus on cascades of bank failures which may 
propagate along the network of interbank credit exposures (see Cihak, 2007, for a recent review). Recently, Adrian 
and Shin (2008) have criticised models which use accounting-based valuations to study transmission of balance 
sheet shocks. Specifically, they argue that such “domino” models may provide an overly simplistic picture of the 
contagion mechanisms as they depend on shocks that have to be large enough to generate defaults in the system. In 
practice, as witnessed by the recent crisis that was triggered by losses in the US sub-prime mortgage exposures, 
even shocks which are relatively modest relative to the sizes of the balance sheets of the affected sectors may have 
severe consequences to the financial system via valuation losses in counterparty exposures. Below we will address 
this critique by adopting the rule of mark-to-market accounting which allows us to consider propagation of 
valuation losses without defaults.  
15 Indeed, in the context of the recent financial sector crisis, mark-to-market accounting has been quoted as a factor 
that accelerated the valuation losses and their spill-over from one sector to another after the financial turmoil first 
broke out in the asset-backed commercial paper markets and paralysed the financing of banks’ off-balance sheet 
vehicles in August 2007. Similarly, of course, the large valuation gains over the years prior to the crisis in several 
asset categories, including housing, corporate stocks and commodities, had inflated the balance sheets of all sectors 
holding such assets or derivatives products written on these assets. These valuation gains increased borrowing 
capacity and allowed for higher balance sheet leverage which in turn exposed the investors to vulnerabilities when 
prices reversed and assets had to be marked to lower market values.  
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asset-side holdings of sectors B and C which own A’s equity (which contracted due to the 
unanticipated P&L shock). Since A’s counterparties are also assumed to be marked-to-market 
they in turn have to deduct the losses on their asset holdings from their own shareholder’s 
equity.
16 But the drop in the value of B’s and C’s shareholder equity will again be reflected in 
a decline in value on the asset side holdings of those sectors which own the equity issued by B 
and C, triggering a further adjustment in net financial wealth and shareholder equity positions, 
and so forth. The process continues as long as some of the sectors report positive earnings that 
offset the initial P&L loss, or, alternatively, the shock reaches a sector that either is not 
connected to any other sector or is not subject to marking-to-market so that it does not need to 
deduct temporary asset losses from its equity.
17 Assuming that the share prices quickly react 
to disturbances and that markets have complete information about the various counterparty 
exposures, the process should take place rather instantaneously.  
 
Chart 4: Transmission of a P&L shock under mark-to-market accounting  
Assets Debt Equity
















To quantify the importance of counterparty losses in our empirical network of sector-level 
exposures, we consider two alternative shocks that were assumed to crystallise at the end of 
2009 Q2. Several shocks could also be assumed to be triggered simultaneously in a full-blown 
                                                 
16 In this stage also the asset side of the initially affected sector will be impacted in so far as there are cross-
shareholdings among agents within this sector.   
17 The assumption that there are no positive earnings surprises in any of the sectors in any of the following periods 
may not be particularly realistic but it is nonetheless useful in that it helps to isolate the effect of the shock and to 
identify the channels of propagation. 
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1124
December 2009 
scenario, but for the purpose of the exercise which is to identify the main channels of 
propagation such simplified sensitivity tests provide the most transparent exposition. To 
measure the impact of the shock over discrete periods of time, we apply a round-by-round 
algorithm which calculates the distribution of the instrument-specific losses in each sector and 
on each round according to the sizes of the balance sheet linkages to the sectors that were 
affected in the previous round. 
The first shock assumes a negative post-tax, post-dividend earnings growth in the non-
financial corporate sector that is large enough to cause a 20% mark-to-market drop in the 
value of shareholder equity. The shock is transmitted to the rest of the system via the mark-to-
market losses in counterparty positions through equity holdings. The second case assumes a 
permanent impairment of 15% of the loans extended to the household sector. This latter shock 
shows first on the asset sides of the sectors that are the creditors of the household sector and 
which have to deduct the loan impairments from their shareholder equity. In the subsequent 
rounds the shock propagates via the mark-to-market losses on equity holdings like in the first 
case.  
 
Table 2: Simulated transmission of balance sheet shocks in the euro area financial 
system  
20% NFC cash flow shock
EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets 
NFC 783 5.54 632 4.47 541 3.83 652.00 4.61
HH 318 3.00 256 2.42 220 2.07 264.67 2.50
MFI 189 0.81 152 0.65 130 0.56 157.00 0.67
INS 122 1.98 98 1.60 84 1.37 101.33 1.65
OFI 405 4.13 327 3.33 280 2.85 337.33 3.44
GOVT 114 3.97 92 3.20 77 2.74 94.33 3.30
ROW 278 3.34 224 2.99 192 2.78 231.33 3.04




15% HH loan impairment shock
EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets  EUR bn
% of financial 
assets 
NFC 70 0.50 272 1.93 225 1.59 189.00 1.34
HH 1.3 0.01 110 1.04 91 0.86 67.43 0.64
MFI 545 2.32 66 0.28 54 0.23 221.67 0.94
INS 16 0.27 43 0.69 35 0.57 31.33 0.51
OFI 80 0.82 141 1.44 117 1.19 112.67 1.15
GOVT 19 0.65 40 1.38 33 1.14 30.67 1.06
ROW 52 0.34 97 0.63 80 0.52 76.33 0.50
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The top panel of Table 2 shows the extent of balance-sheet contagion from the NFC sector 
cash-flow shock, measured both in billions of euros and in terms of percentages of financial 
assets. The sectors that are initially most affected by the contraction of the NFC sector equity 
are the NFC sector itself, plus OFI and government sectors, reflecting the large holdings of 
NFC sector’s equity shares by these sectors.
18 Following this first-round impact which results 
from a direct transmission from the NFC sector, in the subsequent rounds the sectors which 
are large holders of equity of those sectors that were adversely affected in the first round will 
suffer the largest losses. The sectors relatively more affected in these rounds are thus those 
which hold large equity portfolios that are diversified across financial and non-financial 
corporate sectors. For example, the fact that the losses suffered by the RoW sector decline 
quite markedly on the subsequent rounds reflects the fact that its holdings of corporate equity 
assets are mainly concentrated on the NFC sector and it is therefore relatively less affected by 
the second and third round effects that originate from losses also on holdings of equity issued 
by the financial firms in the MFI, OFI and insurance sectors.  
Despite the fact that our network represents a “closed” system the size of the average loss in 
relation to financial assets appears to diminish gradually over time. This is because the 
household and government sectors do not issue equity and therefore within the financial 
accounts they do not transmit the shock further (although they themselves keep suffering 
additional losses every period due to their exposure to other sectors’ equity on their asset 
sides). Instead, the mark-to-market loss of these sectors’ net financial wealth would be 
reflected in the real accounts as a decline in their net lending positions. In other words, in the 
integrated accounts the size of the shock remains constant over the different points in time 
(see also Annex 1).  
Regarding the propagation of the household loan shock, the initial impact that occurs on the 
asset sides of the creditor sectors is by far the largest in the MFI sector which extends the bulk 
of long-term loans to households (in the euro area, the role of the OFI sector is relatively more 
prominent in short-term lending). Once the creditor sectors have deducted the impairments 
from their shareholder equity the shock propagates to those sectors which have large holdings 
of equity, particularly issued by the MFI sector, on their asset side. These further round 
impacts are therefore primarily felt by the NFC, OFI and government sectors so that their 
overall loss in relation to financial assets could exceed the loss that was faced by the MFI 
sector as a result of the initial loan impairment.   
Importantly, the analysis above abstracts from the fact that in a multi-period setting, 
endogenous re-balancing of accounts might become necessary after asset or P&L shocks 
                                                 
18 Recall that the EEA data applied in this paper are non-consolidated and that in the euro area there are large scale 
cross-shareholdings among non-financial firms.  
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caused a contraction of a sector’s equity. In terms of Chart 4, the loss of sector A’s 
shareholder equity results in a drop of value in its liabilities which implies that A may choose 
to de-leverage its balance sheet either by raising additional equity or debt or by dis-investing a 
part of its asset holdings (as shown in the far left part of Chart 4). This dis-investment process 
may follow different “rules”. For example, agents can sell their most liquid or riskiest assets 
first, or they can reduce their asset holdings instrument-by-instrument in proportion to the 
initial composition of their asset holdings. The dis-investment rules can also be state-
dependent in that assets shed in volatile market conditions are different than assets shed in 
more tranquil circumstances. In addition, as illustrated by Adrian and Shin (2008), the 
required asset shedding can be dis-proportionate to the initial equity loss if the sector targets a 
constant leverage ratio. Independent of the rule, by dis-investing a share of its financial assets 
in an effort to restore its balance sheet, A generates price and valuation losses on the debt side 
of the balance sheets of B and C which issued the dis-invested assets. This means that B and C 
in turn may have to dis-invest assets, which could set into motion a process which mirrors the 
one described above. The overall impact of the initial P&L shocks is then likely to be 
multiplied by these endogenous responses as argued by Adrian and Shin (2008).  
In practice, asset dis-investment is complicated to model and at the sector level the algorithms 
guiding such processes are still in their infancy. While the spillover of mark-to-market equity 
losses provides a relatively clear channel of transmission to the relevant counterparties which 
own the affected sector’s equity, in the case of asset shedding not only the instrument but also 
the purchasing counterparty needs to be defined. In addition, it is not straightforward to 
determine the price impact of such “distressed sales” in closed financial systems (see Duffie, 
Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007, for a proposed conceptual framework). The latter is an 
important factor as it will not only determine the net impact of asset sales on the balance sheet 
of the asset-shedding sector but also the extent of spillover to other sectors which issued these 
assets or hold related assets. Nevertheless, once the relevant rules are specified, our model can 
be used to simulate the propagation of losses from asset shedding to other sectors’ balance 
sheets.  
 
5. Measuring systemic risk using risk-based balance sheets   
A key limitation of the presentation above is that it builds on a purely deterministic, 
accounting-based framework and therefore it is not possible to say anything about the 
accumulation and transmission of risk exposures in the financial system. To incorporate such 
characteristics, we need to move from accounting-based to risk-based balance sheets. This can 
be done using models that capture also the volatility of the key balance sheet items, such as 
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shareholder equity and assets. To this end, we draw on recent work by Gray, Merton and 
Bodie (2007, henceforth GMB) and Gray and Malone (2008) who provide insights to the 
measurement of sector-level risk exposures by applying contingent claims analysis (CCA), 
originally developed for assessing firm-level default risk. A particular advantage of the CCA 
approach is that the accounting value-based and internally consistent network model 
developed in the earlier parts of this paper is fully nested in the risk-based framework that is 
the result of the CCA. Indeed, as discussed in detail by GMB (2007), by assuming that 
volatilities equal to zero in the CCA balance sheets, the stochastic elements cancel out and the 
risk-based models collapse to the deterministic accounting framework. The inclusion of the 
risk element opens up many additional insights and avenues for analysis. Most prominently, 
the risk-based “CCA network” implies an additional contagion channel in that also risk 
exposures can propagate across sectors. There are also important interactions between the 
various elements of the model owing to the strong non-linearities that are present in the CCA 
balance sheets.  
 
5.1 The sector-level contingent claims model  
Originating from the seminal papers by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) and 
further developed by Moody’s KMV (2002), the CCA approach is based on structural finance 
models which use options pricing theory and include as inputs data on balance sheet 
liabilities, interest rates, market value of assets, asset return and asset volatility. The output 
consists of the optimal debt-equity structure of the firm, plus a number of risk indicators such 
as distance-to-distress, expected loss, probability of distress, expected recovery rate and credit 
spread over the risk-free interest rate. While some of these indicators are available for 
selected financial and non-financial firms and corporate sectors from various private data 
sources, for other sectors such as households, government and OFIs the availability is much 
more limited, at least from a single, consistent data source.  
The intuition behind the CCA is illustrated in Chart 5, where a firm’s assets and liabilities are 
plotted on the vertical axis against time on the horizontal axis. The value of the firm’s 
liabilities (the thin dotted line) is assumed to be fixed over the time horizon, i.e. all interest 
and amortisation payments on debt are made at the maturity date h of the debt. In contrast, the 
market value of the firm’s assets fluctuate stochastically over time, with the asset drift (the 
bold dotted line) determined by the expected rate of return of the asset. At the end of the 
period, the assets are expected to take a value that corresponds to the mean of the distribution 
of all possible values. Should the value of the assets fall sufficiently far off the mean of the 
distribution to end up below the book value of the firm’s liabilities (the distress point), the 
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firm will default on its debt.
19 It should be noted that “distress” and “default” are clearly 
different concepts, as the former state is likely to be reached earlier than the latter (which in 
many ways can be considered a terminal event). The distress point could be understood as a 
covenant breach or a rating downgrade which typically takes place before default but may 
already have severe implications for the debtor’s ability to continue in business. In the context 
of a sector-level analysis reference to distress is particularly appealing as default of an entire 
sector would, of course, be an almost un-conceivable event. The grey triangular area under 
the lower tail of the distribution measures the firm’s probability of distress, while the 
difference between the expected value of assets and the distress point captures the distance-to-
distress, a popular indicator for corporate credit risk.   
 
















It is clear from Chart 5 that the likelihood that the market value of assets will end below the 
distress point is essentially driven by three factors. First, the ratio of the debt to financial 
assets (the leverage ratio), which determines the vertical position of the distress point relative 
to the initial value of the assets; second, the slope of the asset drift; and third, the amplitude of 
                                                 
19 Another way of seeing this is that when the market value of assets reaches the distress point, all equity has been 
depleted.  
                                                                           Distribution of market value of assets
 




                                                                                              Expected market  
                                                                                              value of assets at time h 
          





Distress point  
(value of liabilities)                                                                                            






Working Paper Series No 1124
December 2009 
fluctuation of the market value of assets around the drift, which is measured by the expected 
volatility of the asset.
20  
 
GMB (2007) take the firm-level CCA models to the financial system level by considering 
interlinked market value balance sheets for the main sectors of the economy. Analytically, the 
total market value of assets A of a sector equals the sum of the market values of its junior 
claims J (mostly equity and net financial wealth) and debt D (other liability items):  
 
P B J D J A − + = + = .   (1)   
 
In (1) the term P captures the expected loss that debt investors incorporate in the market value 
of the sector’s debt and which draws a wedge between the book value (or accounting value) 
of debt B and the market value of debt D. In CCA, the value of the junior claims J and the 
expected loss on debt P are formulated in terms of implicit options whereby the value of a 
sector’s junior claims resembles the value of a call option while the value of the expected loss 
on its debt resembles the value of a put option. The market value of debt can then be written 
to equal the default-free value, or book value, of debt minus the value of the put option. 
 
The values of the implicit options can be solved under the assumptions that are required for 
the Black and Scholes (1973) options pricing model, where the value of a sector’s assets over 
time is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion process:  
 
    t t t t dZ A dt A dA σ µ + =        (3) 
 


































                                                 
































2  and   t d d A σ + = 2 1 .   (5) 
 
In (5), the term A0/B is the inverse of a sector’s leverage ratio; σA denotes the volatility of the 
sector’s assets; µ denotes the “real world” (as opposed to risk-neutral) asset drift; r is the risk 
free interest rate and t is the time to maturity; and the terms N(d) denote the probability that a 
random draw from a standard normal distribution will be less than d. The real world asset 
drift is related to the risk-neutral (or risk-adjusted) asset drift according to the following 
condition.  
A r λσ µ + = , 
 
where λ denotes the market price of risk. The latter reflects investors’ risk aversion and can 
be measured using the CAPM model where λ is expressed as a product of the market Sharpe 
ratio and the correlation of the asset return with the market.
21  
 
From equation 3 we can also derive the value of the junior claims J which is equal to the 
value of an implicit call option, expressed in the form of risk-based net wealth:  
 
) ( ) ( 2 1 0 d N Be d N A J
rt − = .      (6) 
 
For the analysis below, the expression for d2 in equation 5 is a key output of the model. It 
measures the distance to distress (DD), also shown in Chart 5 and it (or its distribution) enters 
into all other output measures of the CCA framework. While we will be studying the 
properties of the DD more closely in the next section, it is nevertheless useful to analyse the 
comparative statics of this measure vis-à-vis the key input variables of the model, leverage 

















                                                 
21 See Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001) and GMB (2007) for a thorough discussion of the conditions that are 
required for relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality which is inherent in models that are based on the Black and 
Scholes pricing formula. 
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The two expressions on the top row state that DD is decreasing in market leverage (defined as 
B/A) and in asset volatility, meaning that higher readings of these variables imply higher 
credit risk. The expressions on the second row confirm, crucially, that these relationships are 
non-linear: in particular, credit risk increases exponentially as balance sheets deteriorate or 
when uncertainty about future asset returns increases. Finally, the expressions on the bottom 
row provide information about the interactions between the two input variables in relation to 
the DD. They suggest that a sector’s vulnerability to a decline in DD as a result of an increase 
in volatility (leverage) is the higher the higher is leverage (volatility). Like a deep out-of-the-
money option, credit risk is very sensitive to volatility shocks when leverage is high.
22 These 
characteristics of the CCA balance sheets are the sources of important features in terms of risk 
exposures and risk transmission that remain absent in the accounting-based balance sheets.  
 
Finally, the empirical solution to equations 4 and 6 is complicated by the fact that we have 
two unknown variables, market value of assets A and asset volatility σA. The standard solution 
technique uses a third equation which exploits the fact that the volatility of assets σA can be 






) ( 1 = .     (8) 
 
Armed with these results, we can solve for A and σA with data on interest rates, junior and 




                                                 
22 A high reading of B/A corresponds to a situation where the strike price of the option is far away from the current 
price of the underlying asset.  
23 The iteration process uses an initial guess of the volatility to determine the market value of assets and asset 
returns. The volatility of the resulting asset returns is used as the input to the next iteration of the procedure that in 
turn determines a new set of asset values and a new series of asset returns. The procedure continues in this manner 
until it converges. We use the Newton-Raphson iteration technique with 100 iterations and 5% tolerance interval.  
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5.2. Estimation of sector-level risk indicators 
When calculating the empirical sector-level indicators for risk exposures, two practical issues 
needs to be considered. First, some sectors, notably households and government, do not issue 
equity that would directly qualify as junior claims. For this reason we define the junior claims 
as equity plus net financial wealth, both of which can be obtained from the EAA data and 
which are illustrated in section 2 above. This means that for those sectors where net financial 
wealth is negative, notably non-financial corporations, the junior claims are less than their 
shareholder equity while for the household sector which issues no equity the junior claims are 
solely represented by their net financial wealth. For the government sector, we follow GMB 
(2007) who measure junior claims by government debt securities issued plus the (negative) 
government net financial wealth position.
24  
 
Second, the value of the distress point B is not straightforward to define because debtors 
typically re-organise the maturity structure of their debt when encountering credit problems. 
The common solution in empirical CCA applications is to adopt the assumption that the 
distress point amounts to short-term liabilities plus one half of long-term liabilities, which is 
supported by empirical research based on large-scale statistical studies on historical defaults. 
These issues are discussed in detail in Moody’s KMV (2002). In the current analysis, the 
financial instruments that were classified as short-term liabilities are currency and deposits, 
short-term loans and debt securities, derivatives instruments and other accounts and 
receivables. Long-term liabilities include long-term debt securities and loans, mutual fund 
shares, net equity of households in life insurance and pension fund reserves and pre-payments 
of insurance premia. 
 
Apart from the EEA balance sheet measures that are used to calculate the values of the junior 
and senior claims, the data for volatility of junior claims, or σJ , for the different corporate 
sectors (financial and non-financial) consists of 12-month implied volatilities of stock indices 
obtained from Bloomberg. For the MFI and the insurance and pension funds sectors, the 
implied volatilities of the relevant sector level stock indices were used while for the OFI 
sector the implied volatility of the financial services sub-sector stock index was applied. For 
the NFC sector, we calculated the average implied volatility using data from all individual 
non-financial corporate sectors. For the government and the household sectors which issue no 
equity we used the implied volatility of the German 10-year government bond yield and for 
the RoW sector the implied volatility of the VIX stock index was adopted. Finally, following 
GMB (2007) and Moody’s KMV (2002) we adopt the convention that λ, i.e. the market price 
                                                 
24 GMB (2007) argue that for emerging economies which often issue debt denominated both in domestic and in 
foreign currencies the foreign currency denominated part could be considered as the junior debt.  
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of risk, is fixed at 0.45, which represents the global long-term average value as calculated by 
Moody’s KMV.  
 
The “intermediate” results from the CCA include the estimated market value of assets and 
asset volatility. Chart 6 plots the sector-level market leverage for the euro area financial 
system for the period 1999 Q1-2009 Q2, defined as book value of debt (the distress point) 
divided by the estimated market value of assets. It can be seen that the market leverage of the 
financial sectors (MFI, insurance and pension funds, and OFI sectors) is generally higher than 
that of the other sectors which reflects the function of the former as financial intermediaries 
and justifies the fact that they are supervised by government authorities. The leverage ratio of 
the MFI sector is very stable over time. This is in line with the findings by Adrian and Shin 
(2008) who show that banks tend to target constant levels of leverage.
25 This implies that 
banks are prone to expand their balance sheets by taking on more debt when the market value 
of their assets goes up and quick to de-leverage when market value of their assets falls. For 
the insurance and pension funds and the non-financial corporate sectors the leverage ratios are 
clearly counter-cyclical as leverage increases “passively” with falls in market value of assets; 
this was particularly pronounced in 2002-03 when the leverage of these sectors increased 
sharply in the aftermath of the burst of the “new economy” stock market boom which had a 
negative effect on the market value of their financial assets. The leverage of the household 
sector is low as its financial liabilities are relatively minor compared to its financial assets (i.e. 
its net financial wealth is high). For most sectors, market leverage picked up towards the end 
of the period. The growth in leverage was first driven by increasing debt levels and later on by 
falling market value of assets after the financial turmoil erupted in 2007 Q3. The increase in 
leverage in the run-up to the crisis indicates that vulnerability to disturbances (i.e. future 
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Chart 7 plots the estimated asset volatilities σA sector-by-sector. A key observation is that for 
practically all sectors, asset volatility reached historically low levels in 2005-06 as the 
financial markets were characterised by ample liquidity, high confidence and low perception 
of risk. This low volatility fed increased risk-taking and accumulation of leverage via popular 
risk management indicators, such as the value at risk (VaR), which by construction are 
increasing functions of volatility; in other words, a fall in volatility triggers a signal that an 
investor can increase his exposure on an asset class without breaching the limits of the risk 
metric. This interplay between volatility, risk measures and leverage was an important 
contributor to the general increase in financial vulnerabilities especially in the financial 
sectors during the years prior to the crisis. After the liquidity in the global money markets 
abruptly dried up in the third quarter of 2007, volatility increased sharply in those sectors that 
were most exposed to the incident, namely banks and other financial intermediaries (which 
include the off-balance sheet vehicles that were at the epicentre of the early stages of the 
turmoil). For the banking and other financial sectors, asset volatility reached extreme levels in 
2008 Q4 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers eroded confidence towards the sector globally, 
while asset volatility also jumped in the non-financial sectors. The global nature of the 
turbulence is clearly illustrated by the surge in asset volatility in the euro area rest of the 
world sector, reflecting the strong impact of the crisis on the financial assets originated and 
held by many of the main financial counterparties of the euro area (notably the US, the UK 
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After the market value of assets and asset volatilities have been calculated, the empirical 
sector-level risk metrics can be estimated. Chart 8 shows the distance to distress (DD, see the 
expression for d2 in equation 5) for the different sectors in the euro area financial system from 
1999 Q1 until 2009 Q2. Since the DD is expressed in terms of standard deviations, it provides 
a measure that is comparable across sectors. The main observations are that the sector-level 
DDs are rather high, reflecting the low distress probability of an entire sector. This 
notwithstanding, the impact of the financial sector turmoil that commenced in the second half 
of 2007 and intensified further in 2008 did cause a marked decline in the DDs (i.e. increase in 
credit risk) of all sectors, most prominently in the banking (MFI) and the rest of the world 
(RoW) sectors. Credit risk also increased in the household and government sectors, reflecting 
the increased volatility of these sectors’ financial assets (which include, among other items, a 
fair amount of corporate ad MFI sector equity), although it remained at low levels relative to 
the other sectors.
26 The fact that DDs dropped sharply only after the crisis had started stresses 
the need to understand the behaviour of its main components. Indeed, by looking at the 
evolution of market leverage in Chart 6 it is clear that vulnerabilities were gradually 
accumulating in the form of rising indebtedness in most sectors. On the other hand, looking at 
the developments in asset volatility in Chart 7 reveals that the relatively “comfortable” 
readings of DDs in the years 2005-06 were mainly driven by historically low volatility which 
could have been expected to reverse at some point.  
                                                 
26 However, the aggregate euro area figures for household sector distance to distress mask important differences in 
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It is noteworthy that the DD of the insurance and pension funds and the NFC sectors also fell 
quite sharply in this time period, even if asset volatility remained at relatively lower levels. 
This reflects the presence of the non-linearities that are characteristic for CCA balance sheets 
as discussed in the previous sub-section: the relatively high leverage of the insurance and the 
NFC sectors makes their risk indicators vulnerable to even relatively small increases in asset 
volatility. However, the DDs of the insurance and pension funds sector remained above the 
low levels reached in the previous episode of financial stress in 2002-2003, reflecting the fact 
that until mid-2009 the epicentre of the turmoil in the euro area remained in the banking 
sector.  
 
Finally, to analyse the interplay between sector-level DDs in the network context, Chart 9 
shows the pair-wise correlations between sector-level DDs calculated as in Khadani and Lo 
(2007). Like in Chart 3 above, it is informative to illustrate these correlations in two distinct 
time periods. Given the likely impact of the recent financial crisis on the correlation 
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Chart 9: Pair-wise correlations among sector-level distance-to-distress measures in the 












Note: The thickest line shows pair-wise correlations in excess of 0.75, the second thickest between 0.50 
and 0.75, the thinnest between 0.25 and 0.50 and no line correlations less than 0.25 or negative.  
 
The main finding is that the correlations between sector-level DDs increased dramatically 
during the financial crisis, showing strong contagion of credit risk, where contagion is 
understood as an increase in cross-sector correlations in crisis times relative to correlations 
during tranquil times (see Gallegati et al, 2008). Prior to the crisis, the DDs were highly 
correlated between the financial sectors and the NFC sector whilst the government, household 
and the RoW sectors showed lower correlations. The fact that the pair-wise correlation 
between the household and government sectors nevertheless was high is interesting given the 
weak balance sheet linkage between the two sectors as shown in Chart 3. This confirms that 
correlation in risk exposures does not necessary require the existence of direct bilateral links, 
but exposures to similar types of assets (in this case mostly cash, corporate equity and debt 
instruments) would also be sufficient. During the crisis period, correlations in credit risk 
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among all sectors surged. The fact that credit risk became highly correlated across sectors 
implies that additional shocks to any one sector would have had the potential to induce 
instantaneous increases in credit risk in all other sectors.
27  
 
An additional feature of the CCA balance sheets is that they include contingent liabilities in 
the form of implicit guarantees that may be extended by some sectors to others. GMB (2007) 
look at the particular case where the government sector provides an implicit guarantee for the 
financial sectors by underwriting a share of the expected losses (essentially, by taking a 
fraction of the put option on its balance sheet). Given the large-scale commitments by euro 
area governments to provide financial support for the banking sector that were announced in 
2008 Q4, some of these implicit guarantees may in fact have become explicit. We leave the 
exercise to assess the implications of these measures on the sector-level risk indicators for 
future work once the data for the full year 2009 will have become available.  
 
5.3. Shocks in the risk-based network of bilateral exposures  
Once the sector-level risk measures have been derived, we bring back to the picture the 
network of bilateral balance sheet exposures. To this end, we exploit the fact that the CCA 
balance sheets fully encompass the accounting-based network. We will first use the 
propagation from the NFC cash flow shock scenario that was illustrated in section 4 and see 
how contagion across balance sheet items affects the risk exposures of sectors that were not 
directly hit by the initial shock. In the second stage we compare the risk-based network of 
bilateral exposures to the accounting-based network and see how the market values of the 
bilateral links might change when the risk exposures change as a response to volatility shocks.  
 
As regards the first point, since the sector-level accounting items that enter the CCA 
calculations are exposed to disturbances which may originate from balance sheet counterparty 
exposures to other sectors, also the risk indicators in the CCA balance sheets should change as 
a result. In addition, when the financial system is confronted by a shock, it is typically the 
case that asset volatility increases. Table 3 shows the changes in the sector-level distances of 
distress – as derived above in Chart 8 – as a result of the non-financial corporate sector P&L 
shock that was considered above in section 4. In addition to the equity shocks from Table 2 
which affect the value of the junior claims in the CCA balance sheets we also assume that the 
volatility of junior claims increases by 500 basis points across all sectors.  
                                                 
27 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) study the co-movements of firm-level value at risk measures during episodes 
of distress using common factor analysis and extreme value theory (EVT). While EVT would provide an obvious 
improvement to the correlation analysis above, given the relatively short time series and the quarterly frequency of 
the balance sheet data, at the current stage our data set does not contain enough observations for such an analysis.   
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Table 3:  Decline in distance-to-distress as a result of a combined balance sheet and 










Decline in distance to distress
 
 
A shock that was assumed to crystallise in 2009 Q2 would have caused the sector-level DDs 
to decrease between 3% and 40% in the financial sectors and between 12% and 20% in the 
non-financial sectors from the true levels at 2009 Q2. The very large percentage decline in the 
insurance and pension funds sector DD reflects the fact that its DD was among the lowest in 
the baseline (i.e. a relatively minor absolute decline in DD causes a large % drop when the 
decline takes place from a low level) and also the fact that, together with the NFC sector, its 
market leverage was the highest, i.e. it was particularly vulnerable to additional shocks. This 
again demonstrates the non-linear nature of the risk exposures in that the more vulnerable 
sectors in terms of balance-sheet leverage tend to show the largest jumps in risk measures.  
 
In terms of stability of the network of bilateral exposures, these non-linearities in risk 
exposures provide an important link to a common feature in network models, the so called 
“knife edge” property. This property states that beyond a certain tipping point, the 
interconnections in the networks that in normal times work as shock absorbers may turn to 
shock amplifiers, spreading rather than sharing the risk. In the context of financial networks 
Allen and Gale (2000) and Gallegati et al (2008) argue that due to this characteristic, risk 
sharing that is achieved in networks might be beneficial only when the overall economic 
environment is favourable but can turn detrimental when the economic environment turns 
bad. Haldane (2009) argues that in certain states, events that per se may be of relatively 
modest economic importance – such as the US sub-prime mortgage crisis – may be sufficient 
to take the system beyond its tipping point. Analysis of risk-based networks provide an 
indication of how this might happen, as gradually accumulating leverage in some sectors 
pushes the implicit options further out-of-the-money and increases these sectors’ vulnerability 
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to shocks elsewhere in the system that manifest themselves in a general surge in volatility and 
may cause large jumps in risk measures.  
 
As regards the second point, to analyse in detail the transmission of risk along the network of 
exposures would require calculation of indicators of bilateral risk exposures. However, this is 
not feasible using the CCA approach because there is no reason why a sector (say, NFC) 
would issue both equity and debt to another specific sector (say, MFI), which would be 
required to calculate the market value of the “bilateral assets” between the two sectors. 
However, we can approximate the risk-based bilateral exposures by using the “re-payment 
probabilities”, or RPPs, defined as 1 minus probability of default (see Shin, 2008, who uses 
the concept of “realised re-payment” which in his model is a fraction of the book value of 
assets). Then, each accounting-based asset item held by sector i would be multiplied by the 
RPP of sector j that issued the instrument.
28 Since the RPPs are sensitive to changes in 
volatility, the approximated risk-based values of the gross exposures that form the bilateral 
links between the sectors can be subjected to scenarios that involve volatility shocks. As 
discussed above, it is a feature of CCA models that the sensitivity of the PDs and the RPPs to 
volatility changes is highly non-linear and large volatility shocks are thus likely to have 
potentially even larger impacts on the risk-based values of the bilateral exposures.  
 
Using data on 2008 Q2, table 4 illustrates the “heat map” of changes in RPP-weighed gross 
bilateral exposures in a scenario where asset volatility of all sectors is assumed to jump to 
30%. This volatility increase would cause an increase in PDs and a fall in RPPs, causing a 
drop in the risk-based value of the bilateral exposures (shown in euro terms in panel (i) and in 
terms of percentage losses relative to the sizes of the unconditional risk-based exposures in 
panel (ii) of Table 4). The rows in Table 4 show the decline in other sectors’ risk-based assets 
as a result of a fall in a given sector’s RPP while the columns illustrate the losses in value of 
the various bilateral gross exposures of a given sector, as a result of the fall in RPP of each of 
the counterparties to its financial assets. Note that even after the large jump in volatility, the 
RPPs of the household and government sectors remain close to one; hence there is no change 






                                                 
28 Following Shin (2008), for simplicity, we assume that all debt is of equal seniority. In practice, the seniority 
structure should affect the RPPs on the various instruments on the liability side.  
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Table 4: Losses in risk-based bilateral gross exposures after a volatility shock, 2008 Q2  
 
(i) In millions of EUR  
NFC HH MFI INS OFI GOV ROW
NFC 1,504,160 520,027 1,758,058 249,124 738,606 235,923 647,099
HH 2 0 11 0 2 0 1
MFI 598,816 1,084,040 735,112 304,805 441,841 167,498 1,003,149
INS 247,056 2,466,417 131,588 104,098 67,476 32,108 171,284
OFI 136,622 182,620 264,830 160,088 141,697 17,820 331,530
GOV 5 6 26 10 10 2 16
ROW 36,588 29,552 55,192 15,234 26,256 7,154 38,587
Total 2,523,250 4,282,664 2,944,818 833,358 1,415,887 460,506 2,191,666  
 
(ii) In % from original exposures 
NFC HH MFI INS OFI GOV ROW
NFC 14 22 21 20 23 21 15
HH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MFI 6 12 10 19 11 5 12
INS 20 98 7 34 5 3 14
OFI 4 10 6 13 7 2 8
GOV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ROW 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Average 6 20 6 13 7 4 7  
 
Note: The rows show the impact on other sectors of a volatility shock assigned to the sector named on 
the left cell. The columns measure the impact on the sector named on the top cell of a volatility shock 
assigned on the other sectors. The darkest cells denote the highest impacts within the sample.    
 
 
A key observation is that the results are rather asymmetric in the sense that the impact that a 
shock on sector i has on its exposure to sector j is different in size than the impact that a shock 
on sector j has on its exposure to sector i, reflecting the differences in sector-specific RPPs. In 
absolute (EUR) terms, the largest losses appear in the risk-based exposures vis-à-vis the NFC 
and MFI sectors (the first and third rows in panel (i)). The sectors that suffer the overall 
largest monetary losses from the reduced RPPs of other sectors are the HH and the MFI 
sectors, reflecting the large financial asset holdings by these sectors in the euro area financial 
system (the second and third columns of panel (i)). However, the largest proportional drop in 
risk-based values takes place in exposures vis-à-vis the insurance and pension funds and the 
NFC sectors, as reported on rows 1 and 4 of Table 4 (ii), respectively. This reflects the above 
observed fact that due to their high leverage and balance sheet vulnerability, the NFC and the 
insurance and pension funds sectors’ RPPs are particularly sensitive to volatility shocks. 
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Mainly owing to the large fall in value of its bilateral exposure to the insurance and pension 
funds sector, the household sector suffers the largest average loss in risk-based exposures also 
in relative terms, as shown in the second column of Table 4 (ii). However, this result would 
almost certainly change if the exposures were weighted in terms of seniority, as a large share 
of the household sector’s bilateral exposures to the insurance sector consists of senior debt 
instruments, such as net equity in insurance and pension funds reserves and pre-payments of 
insurance premia.   
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The financial crisis that erupted in August 2007 has highlighted the need for tools that can 
analyse risks and vulnerabilities in financial systems in a holistic way. While regular and 
detailed analysis of the main sectors of the financial system is necessary for identification of 
developments that may threaten financial stability, it is clearly not sufficient. Modelling the 
interlinkages between the sectors is equally important as this aims at revealing the channels 
through which local shocks can propagate wider in financial systems.  
The network of bilateral sector-level financial exposures that is proposed in this paper takes a 
step to that direction. By acknowledging the suitability of the sector-level flow of funds 
accounts for the purposes of modelling financial networks, we highlighted the overall 
expansion in volume of bilateral exposures over the first ten years of the Economic and 
Monetary Union and the important role of the banking sector in the network of exposures. We 
also showed how the transmission of shocks takes place under mark-to-market accounting via 
the balance sheet cross-exposures that exist in the euro area financial system.  
An important limitation of the analysis that uses such accounting-based data is that little can 
be said about the accumulation and transmission of risk in the system. To address this issue, 
we extended the model by applying the contingent claims approach to sector-level balance 
sheets. By so doing we were able to unearth important interactions between volatility and 
leverage, which form key ingredients of any financial stability analysis. In particular, in 
simulation exercises we illustrated how risk exposures of sectors which show high balance 
sheet leverage are particularly vulnerable to sudden increases in volatility. Moreover, the 
strong non-linearities which are characteristic for options-based contingent claims models 
turned out to play an important role in amplifying the interactions between the risks and 
vulnerabilities in the risk-based network of exposures.  
There are numerous avenues for future research applying network models in the area of 
financial stability and macro-prudential analysis. Provided that more data on bilateral 
exposures at different levels of granularity will become available in the future, the 
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interlinkages and channels of risk transmission between agents in the financial system can be 
better modelled and understood. In addition, further progress in modelling endogenous 
responses to shocks and resulting balance sheet adjustments at the sector level is necessary. 
Such work would also provide important inputs to modelling the feedback mechanisms 
between the real and the financial sectors of the economy, an area of growing interest in 
monetary policy and macroeconomic analysis. Above all, additional research efforts along the 
lines proposed in this paper would enhance the tools and models for financial stability 
analysis and improve the content and accuracy of macro-prudential policy recommendations.  
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